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 Is Polyinstantiation Morally Blameworthy? 
Mikko T. Siponen 





In the area of database/computer security the problem 
of polyinstantiation is widely recognized. The research on 
polyinstantiation can be considered morally questionable, 
since it involves lying. This paper analyses whether the 
research and practice on the problem of polyinstantiation 
is morally blameworthy or praiseworthy in a general 
sense. The morality of polyinstantiation shall be critically 
analysed from the viewpoint of a moral philosophical 
framework. The moral philosophical framework used 
includes 1) Kantian ethics, 2) the "impartial" universality 
thesis advocated by Hare, Rawls, Gewirth, Jewish-
Christian ethics, and Confucian ethics, 3) utilitarianism, 
and 4) Theory of Information Ethics (IE) by Floridi. The 
result of this analysis suggests that polyinstantiation is 
morally questionable, at least in the light of the chosen 
moral philosophical theories.  The aim of the paper is not, 
however, to deem polyinstantiation as morally wrong 
altogether, but to provide researchers and practitioners 
with tools and insights for analysing the morality of 
polyinstantiation in different cases. Moreover, this paper 
sheds new light on the relevance of IE. The results 
suggest that, as far as polyinstantiation is concerned, 
traditional theories seem to be at least as adequate as IE. 
1. Introduction 
 Information security solutions have an increasing role 
in the information age, given that security solutions 
technically ensure or deny access to information. This 
being the case, the moral scrutiny of security actions 
cannot be overlooked - particularly when security 
techniques are developed and used to provide false 
information. Polyinstantiation – which is a central 
research issue in database security (e.g. Lunt, 1991; 
Pernul, 1992; Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995; Ellmer et al. 1995; 
Gollman, 1999) - is such a solution  (developed to provide 
false information). It is developed for maintaining 
different "realities" or cover stories to different user 
groups, and therefore it involves lying to users. In other 
words, users who have, say top secret clearences1, are 
allowed to see the "true" (top secret) information within 
databases, while people who have lower security 
clearences (e.g. secret, classified, etc) are only allowed to 
see false information.  Even though the issue of 
                                                          
1 Herein the security level (e.g. top secret, secret, 
confidential) of the users.  
polyinstantiation is a well-known research issue in 
database/computer security and is morally questionable 
due to the lying involved, it has not yet been analysed 
from a moral point of view. This might be partly due to 
the conventional attitude/moral notion2 of those working 
in the field, that security activities are morally good per 
se. Also, the blind technocratic view that "the scientist 
accepts uncritically the goal A, without questioning it or 
without understanding his or her moral responsibility in 
producing tools for reaching A" (Niiniluoto, 1993 p. 17) 
seems to prevail in the field. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the morality of 
polyinstantiation. There may be a few objections to the 
moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation that are worth 
discussing. Firstly (A), one may claim that the lying is 
intuitively seen as morally blameworthy and the issue is 
therefore obvious. Secondly (B), it may be claimed that 
research is value-free, as is often viewed among the 
positivism tradition. Thirdly (C), one may claim that the 
issue of lying (irrespective of whether research is 
perceived as value-free or not) can be traced back to the 
dispute between positivism and anti-positivism - and is 
therefore more a philosophical issue about the relevance 
of positivism and anti-positivism, which 1) cannot be 
settled (making discussion needless), 2) is not a research 
issue of the IS community, but philosophers. Fourthly 
(D), one may argue that polyinstantiation should be 
accepted due to technological determinism, i.e. 
"technological change is completely and unique 
determined by internal laws independently of human will" 
– and all technological possibilities should be realized 
(Niiniluoto, 1990 p. 181). Fifthly (E), one may claim that 
many security managers do not care at all whether 
polyinstantiation is morally wrong or right, and therefore 
the morality discussion is useless. We shall next consider 
these five objections.  
A) It may be the case that the notion that lying is 
wrong has been inculcated in many of us through 
educational systems (as a conventional moral notion), 
and/or we may consider the imperative “do not lie” as a 
prima facie duty/principle (following the terminology of 
Ross (1930) and Hare (1981), respectively). The crucial 
question is, however, how do we know whether our 
beliefs or conventional moral notions are right? And what 
                                                          
2 The conventional (moral) notion refers to a situation 
where a person unquestionably conforms to the standards 




are the reasons why such lying may be wrong (or right)? 
Therefore, an analysis of such lying from the viewpoint of 
ethical theories will hopefully clarify the moral status of 
these issues. 
B) For the same reasons - given that we want to be 
sure of whether research, and particularly research with 
respect to polyinstantiation, is value-free  – we cannot 
avoid the moral scrutiny. 
C) We share the view of Hare (1985) that the entry of 
the disputes between positivism and anti-positivism in 
moral matters is misleading. It is misleading, since the 
issue of whether research in polyinstantiation is morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy is not epistemological nor 
ontological, but conceptual analytical (see Hare, 1985). 
To include the issue of positivism/anti-positivism into a 
moral inquiry does not clarify, but rather confuses the 
most important question, namely what are ultimately the 
right actions. We do not see that the dispute of 
positivism/anti-postivism is capable of providing any 
explaining justification one way or another, but at worst it 
can be used as a pretence to justify actions dogmatically. 
When it comes to objection C2 about the relevance of a 
moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation, let us recall a widely 
agreed view that IS can be divided into three levels: 
organizational, conceptual and technical (e.g. Iivari & 
Koskela, 1987; Iivari, 1989). The moral scrutiny of 
polyinstantiation is relevant to the IS community since it 
encompasses the technical, conceptual and organizational 
levels. Technical solutions are cases in point with respect 
to the technical level (e.g. see Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995; 
Gollman, 1999), and the modeling of security aspects 
including polyinstantiation (e.g. Pernul, 1992; Ellmer et 
al. 1995; Pernul et al. 1998) are examples of a conceptual 
level issue. Finally, the issue of whether polyinstantiation 
is morally acceptable can be seen at the organizational 
level (the guidelines/principles of right/wrong conduct are 
examples of organizational level research).  
 D) Technological determinism is a naive viewpoint: if 
something can be done it does not mean that this thing 
should be done (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1990).  We can image 
several malicious actions that we could do in theory, but it 
does not follow that we should do such actions just 
because they can be done.  
E) The issue should be important for managers, as 
well. Firstly, it is widely agreed that humans are moral 
beings: we, or most of us, want to do the right thing 
(Taylor, 1975; Hare, 1981; Warburton, 1996). Secondly, 
employees, public and third parties are likely to hold a 
more positive view when organizational activities can 
withstand moral scrutiny. And even if the fifth argument 
is interpreted as a pragmatic argument - claiming that 
some managers may see the discussion on the moral 
status of polyinstantiation as vain - it does not follow that 
the issue should not therefore be discussed from a moral 
point of view.  
The issues of polyinstantiation will be analysed 
through ethical theories including Kantian ethics and the 
impartial universality thesis advocated by Hare (1963; 
1981) and Rawls (1972). As the universality thesis plays a 
role in many other ethical theories (from philosophy to 
religion-based), an analysis in the light of it may satisfy, 
at least in that respect, the requirements of the advocates 
of such theories. Moreover, the issues will also be 
reflected through the theory of information ethics of 
Floridi (1999), which has not been critically analysed as 
of now, and utilitarianism. The research  method of this 
paper is conceptual analysis (Järvinen, 1997). A part of 
this paper was presented in Siponen (1999). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second 
section, the framework for the analysis is presented. In 
section 2.1, the ethical framework is succinctly 
considered and reasoned, and in section 2.2 
polyinstantiation will be briefly presented. In the third 
section, the morality of polyinstantiation will be analysed. 
In the fourth section, certain implications for research and 
practice will be discussed. In the fifth section, the key 
issues of the paper will be summarised.      
2. The framework for the analysis 
2.1 On the ethical framework 
The selected ethical theories are described below. The 
reader may wonder why certain theories such as 
intuitionism, cultural relativism and emotivism are left out 
of the consideration. The reason is that we consider these 
theories as anti-fruitful with respect to moral thinking. 
They do not help us in conflicting situations, for example. 
Say (case 1) that according to the intuitions of person X 
polyinstantiation is acceptable, and according to the 
intuitions of person Y it is not acceptable. Similarly (case 
2), presume that in the culture of person X 
polyinstantiation is acceptable, and in the culture of 
person Y it is not acceptable. What can be concluded 
from cases 1 and 2? Is polyinstantiation right or wrong? 
Which one, X or Y is right? The possible reply that both 
X and Y are equally right is not a persuasive answer for 
two reasons. First, how can the same action in the same 
situation be at the same time right and wrong? Moreover, 
the answer that both X and Y are right does not give us 
much help when we are considering whether 
polyinstantiation is morally right or wrong. It is a matter 
for sociology to study what the personal intuitions 
(preferences) and cultural preferences are. But such 
sociological facts (e.g. what people consider as 
right/wrong) do not indicate what is right and wrong, i.e. 
how we ought to act. 
 Emotivism, as advocated by Stevenson (1944), i.e. 
stating that our moral concerns are nothing but 
expressions of our emotions, is confronted with similar 




expression of emotions, otherwise ethical discussion 
would consists of different sounds, such as grunts, and all 
moral argumentation would become difficult (e.g. 
Warburton, 1995). Moral values cannot be discussed or 
contemplated without reference to emotions, although 
emotions per se are inapt justifications for actions. 
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to do that?” 
Our decisions are always 
subjective. 




The claim that one needs to 
respect all entities leads to 
difficulties. 
KANT's R1 and R3 
Kantian ethics is a traditional theory, three points 
from which will be presented (e.g. Raphael, 1994; 
Warburton, 1996). The first is the sense of duty, the 
second the principle of universality (i.e. act only on 
maxims that you want to be universal laws), and the third 
is the rule of human dignity (treat other people always as 
an end, never only as a means). These will be referred to 
as Kantian requirements R1, R2 and R3. Variations of R2 
have been widely used in Jewish-Christian ethics (e.g. the 
Golden Rule in the case of Christian ethics), Confucian 
ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), and Rawls' 
theory of justice (1972), etc.  
R1 has raised a debate on whether a sense of 
duty is relevant as a qualifier of the rightness of an action. 
Actions stimulated by a feeling of love are not acceptable, 
for example, as love can be blind, and therefore, 
according to Kant, confuse rational thinking. In this 
respect, Kant's doctrine contradicts some different 
doctrines and interpretations of Christian ethics, where 
love (agape) plays an important role in determining if an 
action qualifies as being morally acceptable (e.g. Hare, 
1992a, 1992b; Macquarrie and Childress, 1986 p. 354-
356). However, by looking at an objection to Kant's ethics 
by Floridi (1999), we may see that R1 has its relevance. 
Floridi argues that different sorts of harmless vandalism 
such as a boy stoning abandoned cars (Floridi, 1999 p. 53-
54) cannot be deemed morally blameworthy by using the 
Kantian argument. First, Floridi argues that "its 
ends/means maxim is inapplicable" (Floridi, 1999 p. 54). 
Secondly, the possible problem of the universality thesis, 
if applied to this case, is its possible bias towards 
subjective decisions (see below), resulting in that the 
mentioned vandalism would be accepted. However, 
Floridi seems to have forgotten R1. Namely, it seems to 
be clear that Kantian ethics regards this action (the boy 
stoning the abandoned cars) as morally wrong due to the 
requirement of a sense of duty (R1): its is difficult to 
imagine that a boy's sense of duty (in the Kantian sense), 
given that the boy is interested in behaving morally right, 
includes such stoning of the abandoned cars.  
Kantian R2 and other Universality theses 
One weakness of Kantian R2 (act only on 
maxims that you want to be universal laws) is its lack of 
impartiality. It seems to be possible to formulate maxims 
that are not impartial, when impartiality would bring more 
equality. For example, the adding of different "epithets" 
such as age and status to the maxims to be universalised 
(in a Kantian sense) can result in a partiality that can be 
difficult to justify. One might form a maxim, say, putting 
his/her name or age in it (also presuming that this also 
satisfies the first and the last Kantian requirements), 
thereby allowing some privileges to people whose age and 
name are different from these, for instance. Therefore, to 
avoid a weakness of this kind, the universality principle 
used hereafter will be formulated in an “impartial” 
manner (although no universality thesis is really 
impartial) without the aforementioned qualifiers, which 
are likely to be irrelevant with respect to the morality of 
an action (see Hare, 1989; Kukathas & Pettit, 1990; 
Siponen, 2000 for more). So, if we consider whether 
action X is allowed or not in the light of the "impartial" 
universality principle, we need to ask whether we would 
accept that everybody were allowed to do X (in similar 
situations).   
An interesting objection which seems to apply to 
both partial and impartial forms of the universality 
principle has been outlined by MacIntyre (1986). He sees 
that the universality thesis involves a kind of hubris, given 
that an individual universalising a judgement functions 
also as a 'universal legislator', and that judgement applies 
to all (thus, it is not supererogative, but the action in 
question is required). Hence, MacIntyre ponders who has 
a right to be such a universal legislator? The idealistic 
idea of MacIntyre (1986) has a weakness. Given that all 
actions are supererogative, i.e. not necessary, we are in 
trouble in practical life. To claim that the avoidance of 
killing an innocent person is also supererogative, i.e. the 
avoidance of the killing is not compulsory, but "virtuous", 




The theory of Information Ethics 
The theory of Information Ethics (IE) is a novel 
approach by Floridi (1999), that has not been applied 
much as of yet, and therefore, the reader should consider 
the author’s interpretation of it with a certain amount of 
circumspection. A key element of IE is the concept of 
information entity. Every existing entity (is a consistent 
packet of information and does not contain a contradiction 
in itself, etc) in terms of IE,  because of being an 
infosphere, needs to be respected in a certain sense; one 
should let the entities develop in their natural ways. The 
latter view is called the ontological equality principle 
(Floridi, 1999 p. 44). This ontological equality principle 
becomes interesting from the point of view of anti-virus 
activity. If a computer virus is regarded as an information 
entity in terms of IE, in the light of the ontological 
equality principle, viruses (being information entities) 
should be let ”develop in a way which is appropriate to its 
nature” (Floridi, 1999 p. 44). Thus, if spreading viruses, 
for example, is an action which is appropriate to its 
nature, the anti-virus activity may be wrong, at least from 
this point of view. 
To solve ethical dilemmas, for example, IE 
provides four principles (in order of increasing moral 
value). Three of them are as follows) I) an action ought 
not cause entropy; ii) entropy ought be prevented and III) 
entropy ought to be removed (the fourth principle will not 
be applied here).  
Let consider these principles from the viewpoint 
of anti-virus activity. Anti-virus activity seems to violate 
the null law, given that the action of deleting viruses 
increases entropy (also creation and distribution of viruses 
may satisfy the third law). Of course, a malicious 
computer virus may also violate the null law. In that case, 
one may like to interpret IE in such a way that the amount 
of entropy can be calculated. The final moral judgement 
would be the action that constitutes the least amount of 
entropy: It is likely that the anti-virus activity is the less 
harmful action.  
Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism holds that under any given 
circumstances the action which produces the greatest 
amount of happiness on the whole is the right one. This 
involves taking into account everyone whose happiness is 
affected by the action in question. According to 
utilitarianism, we may 1) calculate the happiness of  all 
beings who are capable of pleasure and pain and whose 
feelings are affected by our action; 2) or confine our 
concern to human happiness. The weakness of 
utilitarianism relates to its incapability of taking into 
account individual preferences. Moreover, it does not take 
into account the "quality" of preferences, e.g. should we 
take the preferences equally into account. Are there 
preferences that are "sick" or inherently bad, and therefore 
should not be counted? Finally, the use of utilitarianism in 
one's ethical conflicts is difficult (see also problems 
related to the doctrine of negative utilitarianism, e.g. 
Warburton, 1996) . How can one person take into account 
everyone’s preferences?  It would require a popular 
election.   
 
2.2 Polyinstantiation 
Such conventional requirements of information 
security as confidentiality, integrity, and availability in 
the area of databases have raised rather interesting 
concerns. One of the concerns that will be explored here 
is the need for maintaining different concepts of reality 
between different classes of users. This requirement 
relates to databases which are referred to as being 
multilevel secure (here the aim is not to consider whether 
they are secure in this way or how successfully they meet 
the security requirements). A database system supporting 
many levels of clearances such as top secret (TS), secret 
(S) and confidential (C) is called a multilevel database 
system. One of the simplest reasons for having such a 
system is to ensure that users who have a clearance for 
seeing secret level information are able to view only that 
level, but not information of the top secret level, for 
instance. Such a system, if it satisfies the requirement just 
mentioned, can be said to be multilevel secure (MLS). 
This requirement has been further tightened to maintain 
different realities, in other words to support lying. This 
problem is technically termed as the problem of 
polyinstantiation. A relation can be said to be 
polyinstantiated when it has two or more tuples with the 
same primary key. The approaches to solving this 
problem technically can be categorised as entity or 
attribute polyinstantiations (Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995) and 
as they both similarly encompass lying, their technical 
differences will not be discussed here.  
Table 1 models an imagined MLS relational 
database system where the earlier mentioned 
classification of different user level clearances has been 
implemented. Let us assume that this example describes a 
relation consisting of information about a space shuttle 
going towards satellite X for military purposes, and this 
real objective can only be viewed by the people who have 
top secret (TS) level clearances (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. An example of polyinstantiation. 
Name Destination Aim 
Space shuttle TS 
Space shuttle S 








This example (Table 1) shows the lying 
involved, as the user having a confidential level clearance 
(C) is mislead to believe certain false information. That is 
to say, the confidentiality level users (C) are being 




destination of the journey is satellite Y and the objective 
is purely scientific. 
3. The moral status of polyinstantiation 
The question whether polyinstantiation is 
morally wrong in general cases and in three particular 
cases (A, B, C) will be considered in the light of each 
theory. 
Polyinstantiation in general cases 
Is polyinstantiation is acceptable in general 
cases? 
  
Case A: Lying is to maintain stability 
Let's assume (as possible argument A) that lying 
with respect to the security of security solutions is done in 
order to maintain a human life that avoids disturbance 
(whatever its exact amount is), since the expression of 
truth would (momentarily) increase the amount of 
disturbance or even chaos. This argument is chosen since 
it is interesting from the point of view of IE.  
Case B: An appeal to private information  
One may try to justify polyinstantiation by 
appealing to the presumed right for informational privacy 
or ownership of information. For example, one may first 
argue that databases consist of private information or 
information that is owned by the owner of the systems. 
Therefore, one may argue that this private information or 
owned information should be under the control of the 
owner. Moreover, this control includes that one should 
have “the right” to hide (parts of) the owned/private 
information (that is “true information, for instance), and 
the right to decide what is “the public side” (herein “false 
information”). The weakness of this argument is that it is 
not obvious that the owners of the systems (e.g. an 
organization) really own all the information – and even if 
their do own it, it does not follow that the owners have so 
full a control over it that it includes manipulation of 
information.  
Even though we might appreciate private 
information - everything has its limits – if not ethical 
dilemmas with respect to privacy would not exists. For 
this reason, e.g. to see whether one’s privacy claims are 
justified, we need ethical theories.  
Case C: It can be used for good purposes 
An often used justification of scientific basic 
research is to claim that the techniques being developed, 
even those associated with weapons research, can also be 
used for morally good purposes. Therefore, the 
development per se, one can argue, is an amoral matter, 
but its application or further use is not. The aim of this 
paper is not to consider whether bombs, for instance, can 
be reasonably justified in that manner, but rather whether 
the techniques of polyinstantiation providing lying can be 
used for morally good purposes? That would perhaps be 
the case when such solutions would be implemented to 
prevent a murder of innocent people, for example if a 
murderer insinuats him/herself into a system having C-
level of clearances and is lured into a trap due to false 
information. It is, however rather difficult to believe that 
most of the solutions would be used for those kinds of 
purposes. It is at least equally presumable that such a 
solution is provided to cover activities that are morally 
questionable.  
Kantian ethics 
It is often claimed that Kant holds a rather 
absolute view towards lying, as indicated in his doctrine 
“on a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives” (Kant, 
1949). This raises objections about how a society can 
really work if lying is unacceptable in such situations as 
Kant describes. However, his view on lying can also be 
considered in the light of the division of perfect and 
imperfect duties, in which the latter are required only to 
some extent, and therefore this latter view, if accepted, is 
similar to a prima facie duty (Hill, 1971). 
Polyinstantiation also seems to violate the 
Kantian R3, since such feeding of false information may 
not recognize the autonomy of other people. For instance, 
a person's autonomy may be violated given that his/her 
decision is made on the basis of false information and the 
decision would be totally different if the individual were 
provided with true information. The result of this is that 
polyinstantion would be wrong according to Kant. All the 
cases violate Kantian principle of human dignity. 
The universality thesis 
According to Kant, a society cannot be based on 
a situation where lying is accepted (Kant, 1974 p. 444), 
and commonly speaking, perhaps many of us would end 
up with a similar belief after application of the 
universality principle: “but what if everyone lied?” Thus, 
the aforementioned view (the Kantian universality 
principle) would likely regard lying as wrong in a general 
sense. This would perhaps also apply to lying related to 
polyinstantiation in a general sense.  
Claims A is not likely to survive from the point 
of view of the (impartial) universality thesis: "do you 
prefer a society where such a activity would be 
accepted?"). Even though in case A, if telling the truth 
would instantly increase disorder (let us assume so), we 
assume that many of us would still choose to tell the 
‘truth’ (as it would be a better option even with small 
momentary increases of disorder than a situation based on 
lying).   
Claim B is also questionable from viewpoint of 
the universality thesis. That is to say, the impartial 




("what if everybody were acting in that way?") The third 
case (C) may be acceptable in the light of the universality 
thesis provided that we would consider polyinstantiation 
as a necessary activity in order to avoid some activity that 
we consider more unwanted (e.g. killing in our example).  
Agape 
Moreover, Christian thinkers may avoid 
polyinstantiation in all the cases since it is difficult to see 
as an expression of love (agape).  It is difficult to see that 
lying in a general sense could be carried out to express 
love. One may argue that the third case (C) makes an 
exception. Given that polyinstantiation is necessary for 
stopping more unwanted activities (that are very anti-
loving activities), it can be claimed that polyinstantiation 
would be acceptable in such a situation.  
Utilitarianism  
Whether polyinstantiation is wrong from the utilitarian 
point of view, can be ascertained by counting the 
preferences of all people. Lying in a general sense may 
also not increase our happiness, but if acting honestly 
maximizes happiness, lying would be morally wrong from 
the utilitarian viewpoint. For example, If A were the 
prevailing state of affairs, and further, assuming that 
disorder due to 'truth' implies unhappiness, the utilitarian 
view would allow lying. If, on the other hand, truth 
increased pleasure, the truth should be revealed.  
IE 
If, in that case (example A), one applied IE, then 
lying might be at first sight morally more favorable than 
telling the truth, given that lying does not increase entropy 
(consider the null/I law of IE), but it may also prevent 
entropy and telling the truth, considering example A, 
increases entropy. In above it was presumed that lying 
does not increase entropy at all. If the lying does cause 
some amount of entropy, however, it may not change the 
result under consideration, given that telling the truth 
would increase entropy more than lying. Although in that 
case both actions may not be morally good (given that 
they both increase entropy), one should perhaps perform 
the action (provided that these are the only possibilities) 
which is perceived better based on the level of entropy. 
Of course, it's not clear that telling the truth (in situations 
such as A) would increase entropy at all. The applier of 
IE, however, might consider lying as morally wrong in 
case A in the respect that correctability (which is one of 
the constructionist information properties of the 
infosphere) is a feature of the infosphere that should to be 
respected. It therefore seems that according to IE we 
should respect the correctness of information, which lying 
is most likely not to do. When it comes to the other cases 
(B, C), the amount of entropy would be the final factor 
deciding whether polyinstantiation would be morally 
acceptable in these situations.  
4. Implications for research and practice 
Based on the moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation, 
we shall formulate a practical guidance for practitioners 
and researchers.  
- Consider whether the polyinstantiation/lying 
can be avoided? Is lying necessary? 
- Consider in which situations polyinstantiation 
is used. Consider whether it is acceptable is such 
situations with the help of ethical theories. For example, 
when applying the universality principle, you need to 
consider the situation and ask: Would you like it if people 
acted towards you in a similar manner, i.e. would you 
prefer that people in similar situations lied/provided false 
information to you? 
5. Conclusions 
Technical research and "design research" is generally 
quite applied by nature, resulting in that moral scrutiny 
cannot be avoided (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1993). 
Polyinstantiation  is an action that is indeed relevant to 
consider from the moral point of view. Lying with respect 
to polyinstantiation was analysed in the light of different 
ethical theories. It is argued that the activity is morally 
questionable, at least in light of the used moral 
philosophical framework. None of the theories gave 
support for maintaining polyinstantiation in a general 
sense. Lying violates the Kantian rules of human dignity. 
IE advocates that information should be true, and most of 
us would not want that everyone in a similar situation 
would provide us false information (universality 
principle). Of our cases, the third case (C) was the only 
one that may be acceptable for polyinstantiation. 
Assuming that polyinstantiation is necessary for avoiding 
more negative activities than polyinstantiation, it may be 
that it  is acceptable. It is concluded that the traditional 
ethical theories (other theories used excluding IE) seem to 
be as adequate as IE - as far as polyinstantiation is 
concerned.  
We hope that this analysis has shed new light to 
practitioners as well as researchers, and therefore provides 
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